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AGREE TO DISAGREE: MOVING TENNESSEE 





“The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, 
but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law and 
society.”1 
 
As Justice Kennedy aptly pointed out, the institution of 
marriage has developed from roots that run deep into human 
evolution. Divorce emerged as a means for parties to dissolve a 
legal relationship. For much of our history, domestic relations 
law reflected religious values that looked unfavorably on 
                                                          
a1 J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Lincoln Memorial University. The 
author would like to thank Professor April James for inspiring this 
Note. This was just one of the many spirited domestic relations 
debates that we had over the last two years. Also, Duncan School of 
Law Dean of Academics Matthew Lyon contributed a great deal of 
time critiquing this Note. Dean Lyon has, without question, raised 
the level of my writing over the past three years. Thank you to both 
of these professors for your time and insight. 
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015). 
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divorce.2 Remedies required proof that at least one party failed 
to conform to society’s expectations—a fault-based divorce. 
Time brings change. Divorce law’s grip on the reigns of 
marriage loosened during the twentieth century.3 
Modern divorce laws have no-fault options firmly 
entrenched in all fifty states.4 As discussed in more detail 
below, the manner and process by which parties use no-fault 
divorce differs significantly across the country. Some states, 
including Tennessee, ask litigants to overcome significant 
hurdles to use no-fault grounds.5 Other states have diverged 
from these restrictive requirements, allowing litigants to plead 
no-fault grounds that allow a court to decide any disputed 
ancillary issues.6 Some states moved even further, removing 
fault grounds completely.7 Despite some ominous forecast,8 
pure no-fault divorce has proved sufficient to dissolve legal 
relationships without damaging society as a whole. 
No-fault opponents have relied on varying economic 
and moral arguments to further a religion-based agenda that 
does not reflect current societal realities.9 Aggrieved parties 
already have access to more efficient criminal and tort law 
remedies. These systems, by design, correct and expel 
unwanted conduct more efficiently than do equity-focused 
domestic relations laws. Moreover, significant declines in 
religious affiliation demonstrate a marked change in societal 
values.10 Divorce law should reflect this evolution and provide 
efficient, equitable dissolution to marital relationships. 
Tennessee should progress toward a pure no-fault 
system. The law currently places an unnecessary burden on no-
                                                          
2 See Deborah H. Bell, Family Law at the Turn of the Century, 71 MISS. 
L.J. 781, 782-85 (2002). 
3 Id. 
4 See David P. Horowitz, Breaking Up Is [Easier] To Do, 82 N.Y. ST. B.J. 
18 (2010). 
5 See e.g., infra note 11. 
6 See infra note 56. 
7 See infra note 58. 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 See id.; see also infra Part V. 
10 See infra Part V. 
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fault divorce that requires both parties to agree on all issues.11 
This requirement escalates contentiousness, increases costs, and 
unnecessarily complicates future disputes over children and 
alimony. A pure no-fault system, or a move in that direction 
that removes the agreement requirement, would increase access 
to the courts for those who need it most. The steadily decreasing 
number of people that affiliate with marriage’s founding father, 
religion,12 should cause lawmakers to reevaluate the current 
statutory requirements and reconsider Tennessee’s restricted 
access. 
This Note will discuss various reasons for Tennessee to 
move toward a pure no-fault divorce system. Part II will discuss 
the historical developments leading to the current system; part 
III categorizes the three types of no-fault divorce used across 
the fifty states; part IV will address several common themes 
among fault proponents; part V focuses on the significance of 
religion in divorce laws; and part VI discusses several reasons 
for changing Tennessee’s no-fault divorce statute.  
 
II. DIVORCE LAW’S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Divorce laws have changed over time to coincide with 
the evolution of marriage. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in Obergefell recognized that marriage was not an unchanging 
institution but a reflection of societal values effectuated in the 
law.13 Divorce laws have followed along this same path. 
 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF FAULT-BASED GROUNDS FOR 
DIVORCE 
 
Divorce in the newly formed United States looked to 
English ecclesiastical courts for guiding precedent.14 Similar to 
corporations, many pre-twentieth century divorces came 
                                                          
11 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (West, WestlawNext current 
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary 
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly). 
12 See infra note 103. 
13 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
14 Adiaen M. Morse Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of Re-
Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 607 
(1996). 
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through legislative acts.15 This cumbersome system gave way 
to a statutorily created fault-based divorce. Courts relied on the 
concept of full-fault divorce to dissolve a marriage.16 Full-fault’s 
narrow proposition required an innocent spouse’s proof that 
the other committed some marital misconduct to grant the 
divorce.17 This process proved insufficient as time progressed, 
eventually giving rise to the concept of no-fault divorce. 
The progression of fault-based divorce law exhibited a 
delayed reflection of societal view of morality. Initially, states 
recognized adultery as the only ground for absolute divorce.18 
States expanded fault-based grounds during the twentieth 
century to include variations of cruelty and abandonment.19 
Interestingly, New York held on to a narrow, antiquated, 
adultery-only definition of fault until 1966, causing director 
Woody Allen to quip, “while the Ten Commandments forbid 
adultery, New York demands it if you want a divorce.”20 Fault-
based grounds for divorce sufficed throughout most of the 
twentieth century, but America’s liberalization in the 1960s 
proved too much for these aging laws. California become the 
first state to implement a pure no-fault system.21 
During the 1960s, the California legislature recognized 
that the fault-based paradigm failed to address the obvious—
most divorces were actually uncontested dissolutions.22 The 
pre-1970 system was fraught with divorces based on false 
claims of cruelty used to comply with the fault requirement.23 
California’s current no-fault statute only permits divorce for 
                                                          
15 Id.  
16 Ira M. Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic 
Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 719, 722-24 (1997). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 See Bell, supra note 2, at 783-84. 
20 See Gabriella L. Zborovsky, Note, Baby Steps to “Grown-Up” 
Divorce: The Introduction of the Collaborative Family Law Center and the 
Continued Need for True No-Fault Divorce in New York, 10 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 305, 305 (2008). 
21 Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3314-51; see 
Bell, supra note 2, at 784. 
22 Herma Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1987). 
23 Id. at 297. 
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irreconcilable differences,24 and developed on the theory that 
fault-based divorce no longer served the public interest.25 
 
B. NO-FAULT DIVORCE GAINS TRACTION ACROSS THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
 No-fault divorce allowed parties to avoid many 
undesirable and all-too-common occurrences in full-fault 
divorce proceedings. Across the country, fault-based grounds 
caused collusion and deception between parties to provide 
courts with sufficient proof to meet statutory requirements.26 
Currently, all fifty states have adopted some form of no-fault 
divorce that avoids this charade.27 
 States have used no-fault divorce to provide a level of 
homeostasis between societal values and the law. Because 
values differ from state to state, divorce laws reflect the 
principle that states can and should differ. Despite some subtle 
differences, the basic reasoning behind no-fault divorce 
revolves around the following principles:  
 
[T]o strengthen and preserve the integrity of 
marriage and safeguard family relationships; to 
promote the amicable settlement of disputes that 
have arisen between parties to a marriage; to 
mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and 
their children caused by the process of legal 
dissolution of marriage; to make reasonable 
provision for the spouse and minor children 
during and after litigation; and to make the law 
of legal dissolution of marriage effective for 
dealing with the realities of matrimonial 
experience by making irretrievable breakdown 
                                                          
24 CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext current with urgency 
legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016 Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 
2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot). 
25 Kay, supra note 22, at 299. 
26 Bell, supra note 2, at 784. 
27 See infra Part III. 
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of the marriage relationship the sole basis for its 
dissolution.28 
 
Keeping with these principles, Tennessee, for example, now 
allows parties to plead irreconcilable differences or to claim to 
have lived apart continuously for a period of two years.29 States 
can be placed into three distinct categories based on how the 
state allows parties to access no-fault grounds. 
 
III. NO-FAULT DIVORCE STATUTES AND THE CONSEQUENCES 
 
States can experiment with new laws that reflect societal 
values and address specific needs. As a result, no-fault statutes 
took on different forms throughout the United States. 
Predictably, different beliefs emerged within the language of 
these laws. The following three categories demonstrate how 
states have diverged from the traditional fault-based paradigm. 
 
A. NO-FAULT ALTERNATIVE IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Rather than allow unfettered access to no-fault divorce, 
some states placed significant limitations on those grounds.30 
These limitations come in several different forms.31 Some states 
                                                          
28 24 GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 2 No-fault 
divorce (2d ed. 2016). 
29 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-4-101(14)-(15) (West, WestlawNext current 
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary 
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly). 
30 See. e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West, WestlawNext current with 
legislation passed during the 2016 Session of the Georgia General 
Assembly). Georgia law withholds any divorce on this ground be 
granted until at least 30 days after serving the respondent. See also 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-42 (West, WestlawNext current through 
Act 1 (End) of the 2016 Second Special Session, pending revision by 
the revisor of statutes). 
31 Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current 
through 2016 released chapters 1-396), with GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation passed during the 2016 
Session of the Georgia General Assembly). Some no-fault statutes 
require complete agreement between the litigants on all ancillary 
issues, while other no-fault agreement requirements leverage 
litigants to avoid unnecessary appearances or time. 
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require significant waiting periods before entering a no-fault 
divorce decree.32 In Arkansas, a couple must live apart for 
eighteen months to obtain a no-fault divorce.33 Other states vary 
the waiting period depending on the no-fault ground.34 New 
Jersey allows an agreed divorce based on irreconcilable 
differences after a six-month wait, while a less agreeable couple 
must live apart for eighteen months before divorce is granted.35 
A number of states still require complete agreement as 
a prerequisite to no-fault grounds.36 To avoid proving fault in 
                                                          
32 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(c) (West, WestlawNext current 
through the end of the 2016 Second Extraordinary, 2016 Fiscal, and 
2016 Third Extraordinary Sessions of the 90th Arkansas General 
Assembly, and include changes made by the Arkansas Code 
Revision Commission received through May 1, 2016). 
33 Id. 
34 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301 (West, WestlawNext current 
through the end of the 2016 Second Extraordinary, 2016 Fiscal, and 
2016 Third Extraordinary Sessions of the 90th Arkansas General 
Assembly, and include changes made by the Arkansas Code 
Revision Commission received through May 1, 2016); LA. CODE ANN. 
ART. 103.1 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 First 
Extraordinary, Regular, and Second Extraordinary Sessions, for all 
laws effective through December 31, 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 
(West, WestlawNext current with laws effective through L.2016, c. 55 
and J.R. No. 6); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (West, WestlawNext current 
through Chapters 93, 95 to 101 of the 2016 Regular Session of the 
General Assembly, pending changes received from the Revisor of 
Statutes); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (West, WestlawNext current 
through the 2016 session, subject to technical revisions by the Code 
Commissioner as authorized by law before official publication); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (West, WestlawNext current through the 
laws of the Adjourned and Special Sessions of the 2015-2016 
Vermont General Assembly (2016)); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (West, 
WestlawNext Current through End of the 2016 Reg. Sess.). Virginia 
appears under both the waiting period group and the complete 
agreement group because the Old Dominion shortens the waiting 
period for those more agreeable litigants. 
35 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-2 (West, WestlawNext current with laws 
effective through L.2016, c. 55 and J.R. No. 6). While New Jersey only 
requires the parties agree on the grounds to avoid the long wait, this 
could allow one party to leverage the other into a long wait, leaving 
child or spousal support issues unaddressed. 
36 See ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (West, WestlawNext current through the 
end of the 2016 Regular Session and through Act 2016–485 of the 
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these states, parties must resolve all ancillary issues in 
advance.37 Whether the couple has children, numerous 
property or business interests, or one party requires the support 
of the other, everyone must agree to a resolution to avoid 
having to prove fault. In most cases, including Tennessee, the 
divorcing couple submits the agreement with the petition for 
divorce.38 Some states also subject the agreement to the court’s 
scrutiny.39 
These statutes limit access to no-fault grounds, 
increasing the likelihood that a divorce assumes an adversarial 
posture that will resurrect the historically defective “kangaroo” 
court procedures just to access the legal system and settle an 
ancillary issue. Before adopting pure no-fault divorce, it was 
estimated that at least ninety-five percent of California divorces 
were uncontested dissolutions where fault was usually 
unnecessary.40 Funneling more litigants toward fault preserves 
many of the issues surrounding the traditional fault-based 
system. 
                                                          
2016 First Special Session); ALASKA STAT. § 25-24-200 (West, 
WestlawNext current with Chapters 2-17, 19-24, 27, 33, 42-43, 52-53 
and 55 from the 2016 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 29th Legislature); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West, WestlawNext current with legislation 
passed during the 2016 Session of the Georgia General Assembly) 
(requiring complete agreement to avoid an appearance); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 580-42 (West, WestlawNext current through Act 1 
(End) of the 2016 Second Special Session, pending revision by the 
revisor of statutes) (using agreements similarly to Georgia); MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 7-103 (West, WestlawNext Current through 
all legislation from the 2016 Regular Session of the General 
Assembly); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current 
through 2016 released chapters 1-396); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (West, 
WestlawNext Current through End of the 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
37 See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-102 (West, Westlaw current 
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary 
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly). 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25-24-200 (West, WestlawNext current 
with Chapters 2-17, 19-24, 27, 33, 42-43, 52-53 and 55 from the 2016 
2nd Reg. Sess. of the 29th Legislature). Alaska requires not only 
complete agreement but also that the agreement be “fair” as 
determined by the court. 
40 Kay, supra note 22, at 298. 
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First, the complete agreement requirement needlessly 
increases the costs involved in situations where the parties are 
already dividing assets.41 Moving toward no-fault divorce has 
decreased costs associated with divorce.42 The emotional toll 
affects everyone involved. Why should divorce statutes 
increase legal fees and other associated costs by requiring fault? 
These savings could be used to support children or provide 
mental health counseling, healthcare, and education. Lowering 
costs and providing more resources at the marriage’s end may 
also avoid other costs associated with future litigation over 
changes in child or spousal support. 
A state-by-state examination of divorce costs indicates 
that no-fault divorce could decrease divorce costs, even though 
the no-fault pioneer, California, maintains the highest divorce 
costs in the nation.43 States atop the list had much higher hourly 
attorney fee rates and court filing fees.44 While the state with the 
cheapest divorce costs, Wyoming, had the lowest filing fee and 
the second-lowest average for an attorney’s hourly rate.45 
Increased costs were found in states with higher costs of living, 
such as California, Alaska, and New York.46 Certainly, a wide 
range of factors can cause divorce costs to increase, including 
fault. States that take fault out of the divorce proceeding at least 
streamline the process, which helps both states with higher and 
lower hourly rates. 
                                                          
41 Erik V. Wicks, Comment, Fault-Based Divorce “Reforms,” Archaic 
Survivals, and Ancient Lessons, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1565, 1582 (2000) 
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 146 (4th ed. 
1992)). 
42 Cf. Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can 
Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 69-70 (1991). This 
author posits that no-fault divorce has lowered some litigation costs. 
43 Elyssa Kirkham, The Best and Worst States to Get a Low-Cost 





46 Id; see also America’s Top States for Business 2016, CNBC, 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/12/ 
americas-top-states-for-business-2016-the-list-and-ranking.html (last 
visited Dec. 8, 2016) (cost of living ranking). 
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Second, requiring complete agreement pressures an 
aggrieved party to compromise legal or economic outcomes to 
avoid the harsh realities of fault-based divorce. In short, these 
requirements provide leverage over weaker parties and could 
force a less desirable outcome.47 As former President Bill 
Clinton taught us, human beings will go to great lengths to 
avoid the embarrassment of publicly airing sordid details of 
marital impropriety.48 
Last, burdening the marital dissolution process with 
these agreements introduces the same danger that no-fault 
divorce was designed to cure. These onerous requirements 
force litigants, at least in some cases, to put on a fault-based 
farce to settle ancillary issues in court.49 Placing unnecessary 
hurdles in the divorce gauntlet urges parties to lie and 
denigrate the entire legal system.  
New York provides an excellent example of just how 
heinous fault-based divorce can become. The Empire State held 
on to tradition, retaining adultery as the only grounds for 
divorce until 1966.50 Because widespread shenanigans were 
occurring during divorce proceedings, as early as 1945 the 
Committee on Law Reform of the City of New York advocated 
for reform in the legislature.51 The legislature finally conceded 
in the 1960s and expanded the grounds for fault.52 However, 
no-fault grounds were not allowed in New York until 2010.53 
                                                          
47 See Allen M. Parkman, Why are Married Women Working So Hard?, 
18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 41 (1998). This article discusses how no-fault 
divorce has affected settlement negotiations by pushing parties 
toward equitable outcomes that place too little importance on 
domestic contribution. 
48 See Peter Baker & John F. Harris, Clinton Admits to Lewinsky 
Relationship, Challenges Starr to End Personal ‘Prying’, WASHINGTON 
POST (August 18, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/clinton081898.htm. 
49 See Kay, supra note 22, at 298; see also Sanford Katz, Historical 
Perspective and Current Trends in the Legal Process of Divorce, 4 FUTURE 
OF CHILDREN 1 (1994). 
50 Zborovsky, supra note 20, at 309. 
51 Katz, supra note 49, at 3. 
52 Zborovsky, supra note 20, at 309. 
53 Sophia Hollander, Divorces Drag on Even After Reform, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (May 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023048113045773681
10112622548. 
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Even then, New Yorkers were limited by an agreement 
requirement.54 Some states have addressed the realities of fault-
based divorce by loosening these restrictions. 
 
B. UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO NO-FAULT ALTERNATIVES 
 
Not all divorces revolve around the elusive concept of 
identifiable marital misconduct. Even with all fifty states 
enacting no-fault divorce, some states place significant 
limitations on the use of those grounds.55 Although reasonable 
minds can differ as to what qualifies as a significant limitation, 
nineteen states have both fault and no-fault grounds for divorce 
that allow litigants to use no-fault grounds without requiring 
complete agreement as to ancillary issues.56 Dissolving a 
                                                          
54 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current through 
2016 released chapters 1-396). 
55 See e.g., LA. CODE ANN. ART. 103.1 (West, WestlawNext current 
through the 2016 First Extraordinary, Regular, and Second 
Extraordinary Sessions, for all laws effective through December 31, 
2016). The Pelican State requires a waiting period of 180 days 
without minor children or 365 days with. 
56 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (West, WestlawNext Current 
through the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-Second Legislature 
(2016)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-40 (West, WestlawNext current with 
enactments of the 2016 February Regular Session, the 2016 May 
Special Session, and the 2016 September Special Session.); IDAHO 
CODE § 32-603 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 Second 
Regular Session of the 63rd Idaho Legislature); IND. CODE § 31-15-2-3 
(West, WestlawNext current with all legislation of the 2016 Second 
Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
23-2701 (West, WestlawNext current through laws enacted during 
the 2016 Regular and Special Sessions of the Kansas Legislature); ME. 
STAT. TIT. 19-a, § 902 (West, WestlawNext Current with legislation 
through the 2015 Second Regular Session of the 127th Legislature. 
The Second Regular Session convened January 6, 2016 and 
adjourned sine die April 29th, 2016. The general effective date is July 
29, 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 208, § 1 (West, WestlawNext current 
through Chapter 298 of the 2016 2nd Annual Session); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 93-5-2 (West, WestlawNext current through the End of the 
2016 First and Second Extraordinary Sessions and the 2016 Regular 
Session); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7-a (West, WestlawNext current 
through Chapter 330 (End) of the 2016 Reg. Sess., not including 
changes and corrections made by the State of New Hampshire, 
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marriage in these states requires pleading only the no-fault 
grounds, complying with statutory requirements, and then, if 
needed, asking the court to decide unsettled issues inhibiting 
the final dissolution of the marriage. 
States with mixed divorce grounds still retain 
traditional ideas of divorce, while also recognizing that no-fault 
grounds produce many advantages. These state statutes 
represent an intermediate step between the traditional full-fault 
systems and no-fault systems implemented in states taking a 
different approach to family law. Introducing no-fault divorce 
would allow parties to proceed without an understanding that 
some perjury will take place, permit the court to grant a divorce 
without contorting the law outside of legislative intent, and 
avoid committing the legal system to a charade that disrespects 
the entire litigation process.57 
 
C. PURE NO-FAULT DIVORCE 
 
Unsatisfied with how a fault-based system addressed 
family law concerns, seventeen states have adopted a pure no-
                                                          
Office of Legislative Services); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1 (West, 
WestlawNext current through the end of the Second Regular and 
Special Sessions of the 52nd Legislature (2016)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-04-03 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 Special 
Session of the 64th Legislative Assembly and measures passed in the 
June 14, 2016 election); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (West, 
WestlawNext current through File 124 of the 131st General Assembly 
(2015-2016)); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 43, § 101 (West, WestlawNext current 
through Chapter 395 (End) of the Second Session of the 55th 
Legislature (2016)); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301 (West, WestlawNext 
current through 2016 Regular Session Acts 1 to 109); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 25-4-2 (West, WestlawNext current through 2016 Session 
Laws and Supreme Court Rule 16-67); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 
(West, WestlawNext current through the end of the 2015 Regular 
Session of the 84th Legislature); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-3 (West, 
WestlawNext current through 2016 Third Special Session); W. VA. 
CODE § 48-5-201 (West, WestlawNext current with legislation of the 
2016 Regular Session, the 2016 First Extraordinary Session, and the 
2016 Second Extraordinary Session). 
57 See Sanford N. Katz, Historical Perspective and Current Trends in the 
Legal Process of Divorce, 4 CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 1 (1994). 
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fault system.58 The language may vary, but the statutes contain 
a consistent theme—divorce does not require proof of fault. As 
states have progressed toward this model, naysayers have 
forecast numerous scenarios that will upend society as we 
know it.59 But pure no-fault models simply remove an 
                                                          
58 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext current with 
urgency legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016 Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of 
2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 14-10-106 (West, WestlawNext current through the 
Second Regular Session of the 70th General Assembly (2016)); DEL. 
CODE ANN. TIT. 13, § 1505 (West, WestlawNext current through 80 
Laws 2016, ch. 430); FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (West, WestlawNext current 
through the 2016 Second Regular Session of the Twenty-Fourth 
Legislature); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401 (West, WestlawNext current 
through P.A. 99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE § 598.17 
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation from the 2016 
Reg.Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (West, WestlawNext 
current through the end of the 2016 regular session); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 552.6 (West, WestlawNext current through P.A.2016, No. 314 
of the 2016 Regular Session, 98th Legislature); MINN. STAT. § 518.06 
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation through the end of the 
2016 Regular Session.); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.305 (West, WestlawNext 
current through the end of the 2016 Regular Session and Veto 
Session of the 98th General Assembly, pending changes received 
from the Revisor of Statutes. Constitution is current through the 
November 4, 2014 General Election.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-104 
(West, WestlawNext current through the 2015 session); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 42-353 (West, WestlawNext current through the end of the 
104th 2nd Regular Session (2016)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (West, 
WestlawNext current through the end of the 78th Regular Session 
(2015) and 29th Special Session (2015) of the Nevada Legislature and 
all technical corrections received by the Legislative Counsel Bureau); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (West, WestlawNext current with 2016 Reg. 
Sess. legislation eff. through 7/1/16 and ballot measures on the 
11/8/16 ballot, pending classification of undesignated material and 
text revision by the Oregon Reviser); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030 
(West, WestlawNext current with all laws from the 2016 Regular and 
First Special Sessions of the Washington legislature that take effect 
on or before July 1, 2016); WIS. STAT. § 767.315 (West, WestlawNext 
current through 2015 Act 392, published 4/27/2016); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 20-2-104 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 
Budget Session). 
59 See e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, Marriage and Some Troubling Issues with 
No-Fault Divorce, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 243 (2004-2005). This article 
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unnecessarily contentious aspect of divorce law. Most of these 
states use the terms “irretrievably broken” or “irreconcilable 
differences” for the legal ground. Parties may then settle a case 
by agreement or move forward with litigation or mediation to 
decide ancillary issues. 
Pure no-fault does not leave parties without sufficient 
remedies, even when fault is the predominant factor in the 
divorce. For example, assume that a couple in a pure no-fault 
state marries, maintaining that relationship for ten years and 
has two children. Husband develops a prescription drug habit 
that eventually leads to the demise of this marriage. Wife 
decides the children should stay away from husband’s drug 
habit and files for divorce. No-fault grounds would not cloak 
the undesirable behavior of the husband. Rather, the court, or a 
mediator in some cases, would take his behavior into account 
when addressing child custody, property division, and 
alimony. A court could then adjudicate ancillary issues using 
the same equitable principles that the fault-based systems are 
supposed to be based on.60 
Many litigants may avoid proof of fault altogether. 
Determining an equitable distribution is not an exact science. 
Parties may differ on the accounting methods used to 
determine business values,61 or haggle over the type of alimony 
to be awarded.62 Why should domestic relations laws force 
parties to show fault for the court to decide these issues? This 
appears a puzzling, unnecessary, and counterproductive 
requirement. Fault advocates have argued that no-fault allows 
litigants to skirt responsibility.63 Other fault-based arguments 
focus on outlier cases with controversial outcomes to disparage 
the entire system.64 These arguments against no-fault are 
                                                          
attributes increased divorce rates to the adoption of no-fault divorce 
statutes. 
60 See Bell, supra note 2, at 793-94. 
61 See e.g., Powell v. Powell, 124 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
62 See e.g., Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2011). 
63 Ellman, supra note 16, at 733. The author describes no-fault divorce 
as reflecting “amoral thinking.”  
64 See Swisher, supra note 59, at 254. The author uses In re Koch, 648 
P.2d 406 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), as an example of no-fault removing 
needed remedies for injured parties. In Koch, the court held that a 
wife could not use her injuries from a physical altercation for the 
basis of a spousal support claim. The wife’s tort case against the 
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treated with more depth below. This back-and-forth does 
emphasize that in each system individual judges and attorneys 
will determine how efficiently and effectively the system 
works. No perfect system exists, but no-fault systems reflect 
reality and provide access to the judicial system that the fault-
based system does not. 
 
IV. NO-FAULT OPPONENTS BLAME THE SYSTEM FOR 
UNRELATED SOCIETAL TRENDS 
 
The beauty and utility of American democracy lies in 
the struggle between liberal and conservative ideologies. 
Middle ground has moved this country forward at a pace that 
both respects our history and recognizes societal changes. 
Certainly this system has its faults,65 and divorce laws are not 
immune to this struggle. The categories above demonstrate 
how states have implemented divorce laws that reflect 
divergent views of marriage. Since no-fault’s inception in 1970, 
time has provided ammunition for both sides to take aim at the 
other. No-fault opponents rely on a narrow, dystopian view of 
the results in no-fault states to argue fault back into domestic 
relations law. 
 
A. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND THE INCREASE IN DIVORCE 
RATES 
 
Ostensibly, divorce rates provide an elementary 
indicator of no-fault’s allegedly adverse effect on society. While 
relevant, divorce numbers only provide a small piece of the 
entire puzzle. No-fault opponents argue that increased divorce 
rates are directly related to no-fault divorce statutes.66 
                                                          
husband for the same injury was pending at the time of the divorce 
decree. 
65 See, e.g., Eric Warner, Gridlock in Congress may Presage More of the 




66 Michael McManus, Confronting the More Entrenched Foe: The 
Disaster of No-Fault Divorce and Its Legacy of Cohabitation, THE FAMILY 
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Overwhelmingly, the increase in the 1970s provides the basis 
for this assertion.67 This ignores a much longer trend—divorce 
rates in America have been steadily rising since the 1860s.68 One 
might quickly correlate these increases to expansions in fault 
and the development of no-fault divorce. But no-fault divorce 
has only become more prolific since the 1970s.69 In Tennessee 
for example, divorce rates have leveled off and even declined 
during that period.70  
Arguments based on divorce rates ignore numerous 
other aspects that affect those numbers. If reducing divorce 
numbers were as simple as making divorce more difficult, as 
fault-based divorce certainly does, then barring divorce 
altogether presumably would lower the rate to zero. As recently 
as 1997, Ireland amended its constitution to permit divorce for 
the first time in over 50 years.71 The same arguments no-fault 
detractors use were made in opposition to the constitutional 
amendment permitting the Irish to obtain a divorce.72 As the 
                                                          
IN AMERICA (Spring 2011), 
http://familyinamerica.org/files/9913/8757/6279/ 
FIA.Spring11.McManus.pdf. 
67 See Swisher, supra note 59, at 243-44. 
68 See 100 YEARS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, 1973, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/ 
sr_21/sr21_024.pdf. 
69 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current through 
2016 released chapters 1-396). Even the most stringent holdouts 
adopted no-fault grounds, providing some no-fault access in all 50 
states. 
70 Compare TENN. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND 
DIVORCES WITH RATES PER 1,000 POPULATION BY COUNTY, TENNESSEE 
RECORDED DATA, 2009, https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/ 
attachments/TN_Marriages_Divorces_-_2009.pdf, with TENN. DEP’T. 
OF HEALTH, NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES WITH RATES PER 
1,000 POPULATION BY COUNTY, TENNESSEE RECORDED DATA, 2014, 
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/TN_Marr
iages_Divorces_-_2014.pdf; see also note 81, infra. 
71 James F. Clarity, Before Date of New Law, Ireland Grants First Divorce, 
N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 18 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/18/world/before-date-of-new-
law-ireland-grants-first-divorce.html. 
72 Kate Holmquist, Divorce, Irish Style, THE IRISH TIMES (Jan. 17, 2015), 
http://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/divorce-irish-style-
1.2068656. 
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Irish realized, addressing family law issues requires more 
nuance than a simple prohibition.73 
Wealth and education affect divorce numbers across the 
country more than fault-based divorce statutes. Divorce rates 
are obviously tied to marriage rates. Socioeconomic status and 
education affect both marriage and divorce far more than no-
fault opponents give credence.74 A Pew Research study in 2009 
found that education levels correlated with both marriage 
rates75 and the average age at which people marry.76 Although 
the Pew study found no direct correlation between 
socioeconomic status and divorce, socioeconomic status and 
education affected the average marriage age, and age did show 
a correlation to divorce rates.77 This demonstrates only one 
factor affecting divorce rates, while many other factors, 
including religious affiliation,78 foreign military engagements,79 
and economic recessions also affect divorce.80 Presuming that 
people will suddenly abandon a personal relationship or, 
conversely, stay in a relationship based on a state’s legal 
requirements ignores too many realities. 
                                                          
73 Id. 
74 See Social and Demographic Trends, The States of Marriage and 




76 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MARRIAGE AND 




77 See Social and Demographic Trends, supra note 74. 
78 See infra Part V. 
79 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 100 YEARS OF 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES, 1867 – 1967, 
supra note 68. Divorce rates rose around the time of the Second 
World War. 
80 D’Vera Cohn, Divorce and the Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (May 2, 2012), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/05/02/divorce-and-the-
great-recession/. This study found a correlation between foreclosure 
and divorce rates but not between unemployment increase and 
divorce rates. 
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Over the past twenty-five years, divorce rates have 
decreased in both no-fault and fault-based states.81 The chart 
below shows these trends using states that are close 
geographically and have no-fault divorce statutes from each 
category. Despite the three different approaches, divorce rates 
have followed the same trend—a decline.82 Kentucky’s pure no-
fault approach has at most a negligible impact on divorce rates. 
These numbers do not corroborate the argument that no-fault 
divorce equals increased divorce. 
 
 
B. NO-FAULT DIVORCE FAILS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT 
REMEDIES 
 
Another argument against no-fault divorce is that 
eliminating fault causes outcomes that fail to provide for 
aggrieved parties.83 No-fault opponents have argued that 
victims of poor marital behavior lack any real recourse when 
fault does not play a significant role in divorce.84 Even then, 
                                                          
81 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVORCE 
RATES BY STATE: 1990, 1995, AND 1999-2014, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/state_divorce_rates_90_95_a
nd_99-14.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2016). 
82 Id. 







1990 2000 2010 2014
Divorce Rates per 1,000 People by State: 
1990-2014
Tennessee (restricted use) Kentucky (pure no-fault)
Mississippi (unrestricted)
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fault advocates have still suggested tort and criminal law may 
provide sufficient remedies.85  
No-fault divorce does not leave victims out in the cold, 
and these other areas of law are better suited to remedy 
particular types of marital misconduct. Criminal law reflects 
society’s social norms for expected human behavior.86 This 
essential area of the law provides an efficient platform for 
society to set moral expectations that place limitations in 
various arenas when undesirable conduct occurs.87 Physical 
spousal abuse, behavior unquestionably in violation of society’s 
social norms, could and should be addressed for the most part 
in the criminal context. Moreover, defendants in criminal 
procedures receive greater protections, including proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, right to confront 
witnesses, and the right to a jury.  
In the civil context, tort law provides compensatory 
remedies outside of marriage dissolution. The evolution of 
interspousal immunity allowed aggrieved parties access to 
these tort remedies in a variety of situations.88 Tort law 
provides time-proven methods to calculate damages, while 
retaining limits on claims too stale for remedy.89 The principles 
underpinning support and alimony laws were designed based 
on an entirely different idea—equity.90 Alimony in Tennessee, 
for instance, focuses on the ability of the spouse seeking the 
award to live post-divorce, the other spouse’s ability to pay the 
award, and several other equitable factors.91 In contrast, tort 
remedies focus simply on the wrongful conduct and the 
                                                          
85 See id. 
86 Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in 
Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2016). 
87 See id. 
88 See e.g., Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983) (holding 
interspousal tort immunity is totally abolished in Tennessee); see also 
Michelle L. Evans, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The Child 
that No Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 466 
(2009). 
89 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 1-2 (AM. LAW INST. 2016). 
90 Id. 
91 See, e.g., Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1995). 
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damage flowing from that conduct.92 While similar policy 
considerations may play a part in torts and domestic relations 
law, the two are fundamentally different. 
Divorce should focus on what it was designed to do—
dissolve a legal relationship. If the relationship is no longer 
viable, i.e. irretrievably broken, then the court should only 
require proof that the relationship is in fact broken and leave 
the “why” for a possible factor for determining equitable 
allocation of property, ordering support, or determining child 
custody. The particulars as to the extent of damage caused or 
the need for punishment to deter future incidences are better 
left to criminal or tort law. Introducing these ideas into 
marriage dissolution bogs down the process and confuses law 
and equity. This could possibly cause important aspects of 
marriage dissolution to be resolved inefficiently or in a manner 
which cannot adequately address or deter undesirable conduct. 
Simply put: A fault-based divorce is counterproductive. 
 
C. NO-FAULT AVOIDS RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Marriage symbolizes a certain amount of commitment 
within a relationship. With commitment comes responsibility. 
Some no-fault critics have contended the absence of fault not 
only allows parties to avoid moral responsibilities, but also 
allows certain behavior outside the contractual bonds of 
marriage to go unpunished.93 Conservative scholars have 
argued that catastrophic consequences will result from the 
ubiquity of divorce, even causing a decline in birth rates.94 To 
                                                          
92 See, e.g., Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 
2012). 
93 Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 871 (June 1994). The authors argue that 
changes in divorce law have rendered the marriage contract illusory. 
94 See id. Brinig and Crafton discuss the decreasing birth rate when 
marriage morphs into a long date. See Scott Drewianka, Divorce Law 
and Family Formation, 21 J. POPULATION ECON. 484 (2006). Dr. 
Drewianka’s article examines several studies that contend no-fault 
divorce significantly contributed to the decline, and posits that no-
fault divorce had minimal effect on family structure. 
106                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017) 
 
steal a line from the rock band R.E.M., under no fault- divorce 
“it’s the end of the world as we know it.”95 
Chaining responsibility to fault is counterintuitive. 
Child support is an established responsibility in which fault 
need not play a role. Courts impose obligations that encourage 
responsibility outside of marital relationships in every 
jurisdiction. The traditionalist view of divorce holds fast to the 
fault system to preserve the moral leverage interjected by fault 
into divorce proceedings. Traditionalists use complete 
agreements to impose that same leverage to a lesser degree. 
Some have argued that alimony without fault has no teeth.96 
Yet, alimony statutes, such as Tennessee’s, consider a totality of 
circumstances in each divorce with or without unscrupulous 
behavior.97 Removing fault does not render the marital contract 
illusory, nor does it allow irresponsible behavior to proliferate. 
Removing the impediments to no-fault grounds in 
mixed states would allow parties to access an equitable system 
for settling disputes. Unnecessary requirements force parties 
into a fault-based paradigm that expands costs and increases 
public humiliation. Forcing fault, by requiring complete 
agreement or imposing long waits, possibly allows 
irresponsible behavior to go unaddressed. At minimum, 
litigants should have the no-fault option without coming to an 
agreement. Imposing substantial conditions on no-fault 
grounds is a thinly-veiled attempt to keep old fault-based 
notions of divorce, rather than preventing some injustice. 
 
V. DECLINING RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AFFECTS SOCIETAL 
VIEWS ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
 
Marriage certainly has roots that run deep into human 
history.98 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[m]arriage 
                                                          
95 R.E.M., It’s the End of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine), on 
DOCUMENT (I.R.S. 1987). 
96 See Brinig, supra note 93, at 877-78. 
97 See, e.g., Gonsewki, supra note 62. 
98 See Robert S. Walker, ET AL., Evolutionary History of Hunter-Gatherer 
Marriage Practices, PLOS ONE (April 25, 2011), 
https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/sdrewian/www/DivorceLawAndFa
milyFormation.pdf. 
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is sacred to those who live by their religions.”99 For much of 
America’s history, an overwhelming majority of the population 
identified with one faith or another.100 Although our First 
Amendment authors recognized the need for separation 
between government and religion,101 moral values based on 
religious beliefs have been manifest through our governing 
laws.102 Laws governing marriage and marriage dissolution 
should continue that process and reflect current societal change. 
A declining emphasis on religious affiliation could signal the 
next step for domestic relations law. 
 
A. STUDIES SHOW A DECLINE IN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 
 
Religious belief and practice appears to be in decline 
across the board, and in steep decline among younger 
generations. A recent study from the Pew Research Center 
reveals a decline in religious affiliation across the United 
States.103 A survey of more than 35,000 adults found that those 
who say they believe in God has declined in recent years.104 This 
decline did not come from older adults, but overwhelmingly 
from millennials.105 Many of those millennials simply chose not 
                                                          
99 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
100 See e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Religion and the Founding of the 
American Republic (last visited Sept. 5, 2016), 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/index.html; see also PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, Regional Distribution of Christians (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/global-christianity-
regions/. 
101 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
102 See e.g., TENN. CONST. art. IX, § 2. Article IX, section 2 declares that 
“no person who denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards 
and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of this 
State.” See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a 
Texas law banning homosexual intimate contact was 
unconstitutional). 
103 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious: Modest 
Drop in Overall Rates of Belief and Practice, but Religious Affiliated 





108                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017) 
 
to identify with religion at all.106 The percentage of adults who 
were religiously unaffiliated rose sharply, with many 
respondents claiming to have no belief in God whatsoever 
(referred to in the study as “nones”).107 Specifically, seven in ten 
millennials say that religion has little to no importance in their 
life.108 
Tennessee adults who identified as a “none” made up 
fourteen percent of the total number.109 This study noted a 
significant decline in religious affiliation between 2007 and 
2014.110 Interestingly, Pew’s research found that adults in the 
Volunteer State feel substantially more at peace than in the 2007 
study.111 These trends mirror those in Kentucky, where no-fault 
divorce has persisted for decades.112 In fact, downward trends 
in religious affiliation were found across the southeastern 
United States.113 
Recent Gallup numbers show that religious affiliation 
has been on a steady decline for several decades.114 The number 
of people that have no religious affiliation has grown nearly 




109  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adults in Tennessee (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-
study/state/tennessee/. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Kentucky (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-
study/state/kentucky/. 
113 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Alabama (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-
study/state/alabama/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in 
Arkansas (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/state/arkansas/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 
Adult in Mississippi (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-
study/state/mississippi/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in 
Georgia (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/state/gerogia/. 
114 GALLUP, Religion: What is your religious preference – protestant, 
Roman Catholic, another religion, or no religion?. (last visited Sept. 5, 
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx. This poll 
shows the rise of the “nones” over several decades. 
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tenfold over the six decades covered in this survey.115 These 
numbers show that Americans are placing less and less 
emphasis on religious beliefs. As younger generations of 
Americans replace baby boomer populations, the percentage of 
Americans who see the law through the lens of religious 
teachings may fall substantially from where it is now. Looking 
forward, a move toward less religion-based morality in 
domestic relations law may align the law with the values of the 
most affected population. Domestic relations law has followed 
religious affiliation in the past. Why not now? 
 
B. MARRIAGE IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH RELIGION 
 
American marriage finds its historical underpinnings 
intertwined with religion. In religious context, the reverence 
given the marital bond dates back to the book of Genesis, where 
the Bible says “shall a man leave his father and his mother, and 
shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall become one flesh.”116 
Islam also reveres the bond of marriage, encouraging followers 
to marry in order to garner the favor of Allah.117 Judaism 
defines how a woman is “acquired” as either with money, 
contract, or sexual intercourse.118 All of the above, despite 
subtle differences, refer to a relational bond between persons. 
The law gives legal recognition to that relationship. 
The progression of domestic relations law has tracked 
America’s religious beliefs. Courts could not break the bond of 
marriage in nineteenth century England.119 Divorce law has 
progressed and established divorce, expanded fault grounds, 
and then developed no-fault grounds.120 The decrease in 
religious affiliation seems to accompany, at least in some 
degree, that trend. That is not to say that the decline in religious 
affiliation tells the whole story of increased divorce rates. It 
does not.121 But the correlation between marriage and religion 
                                                          
115 Id. 
116 Genesis 2:22-24 (King James). 
117 Surah 24:32. 
118 Mishnah Kiddushin 1:1. 
119 Bell, supra note 2, at 782. 
120 See supra Part II. 
121 See supra Part IV. 
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is undeniable, and, as some conservatives might argue, 
necessary to preserve the institution. 
Divorce laws reflect the link between society’s concept 
of marriage and religion. A quick survey comparing states 
populating the Bible belt with more liberal states on the West 
Coast reveals the philosophical dichotomy of marriage.122 
States in the Bible belt have higher religious affiliation than 
states that began the no-fault divorce trend on the west coast.123 
This also explains why New York, with its large Catholic 
population, has resisted the development of no-fault divorce.124 
With religious affiliation on the decline, even in the Bible belt, 
fault-based divorce should follow suit. 
 
 
                                                          
122 Compare ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (West, WestlawNext Current through 
the end of the 2016 Regular Session and through Act 2016–485 of the 
2016 First Special Session), and GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West, 
WestlawNext current with legislation passed during the 2016 Session 
of the Georgia General Assembly), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-102 
(West, WestlawNext Current through end of the 2016 Second 
Regular and Second Extraordinary Sessions of the 109th Tennessee 
General Assembly), with CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext 
current with urgency legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016 
Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on 
2016 ballot), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-106 (West, WestlawNext 
current through the Second Regular Session of the 70th General 
Assembly (2016)), and OR. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (West, WestlawNext 
current with 2016 Reg. Sess. legislation eff. through 7/1/16 and 
ballot measures on the 11/8/16 ballot, pending classification of 
undesignated material and text revision by the Oregon Reviser). 
Bible belt states hold fast to fault-based divorce by restricting access 
to no-fault grounds in attempt to limit the divorce numbers. 
California, Colorado and Oregon have discarded fault altogether, 
focusing resources on other family law related issues. 
123 Compare PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Oregon (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/ 
religious-landscape-study/state/oregon/; with PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER, Adult in Tennessee (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-
study/state/tennessee/. Thirty-one percent of the Beaver state’s 
adults do not affiliate with any religion. Compare that with eighteen 
percent in Tennessee. 
124 See Zborovsky, supra note 20. 
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C. SOCIETAL CHANGES URGE DIVORCE LAW REFORM 
 
Legal divorce, expanded fault grounds, and no-fault 
divorce have all correlated with changes in society.125 Divorce 
laws should undergo legislative scrutiny as these changes 
occur. A liberal movement preceded no-fault laws in states like 
California, Oregon, and Colorado without catastrophic 
consequences.126 Kentucky, a state not necessarily known for its 
progressive values, adopted a pure no-fault model in 1972.127 
The no-fault model in Kentucky has not significantly increased 
the divorce rate.128 Other changes were afoot across the United 
States that affected those rising numbers. 
The late 1960s and 1970s brought about a political 
revolution that was reflected first in divorce statistics and then 
the law.129 A shift toward personal autonomy contributed to 
legislatures reforming divorce laws.130 The civil rights 
movement, women’s liberation campaign, and the beginning of 
the LGBT movement all represented a shift in American 
politics.131 Combined with an emotional antiwar movement, the 
1960s pushed some American laws to the left, discarding 
several traditionalist values entrenched for over 100 years.132 
                                                          
125 See supra Part IV. 
126 See, e.g., Kay, supra note 22. 
127 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (West, WestlawNext current 
through the end of the 2016 regular session). 
128 See KENTUCKY MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, Marriage & Divorce Rates by 
County (last visited Jul. 20, 2016), 
http://www.kentuckymarriage.org/marriage-in-
kentucky/marriage-divorce-rates-by-county/; see CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVORCE RATES BY STATE: 1990, 
1995, AND 1999-2014, supra note 77. 
129 See Perry, supra note 42, at 62. 
130 Id. 
131 See e.g. STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, PORT HURON 
STATEMENT (1962), reprinted in Radical Reader 468 (Timothy 
McCarthy & John McMillan eds. 2003). The Port Huron Statement 
embodied the discontent of a younger generation with oppressive 
civil rights. See e.g., BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963) 
reprinted in Radical Reader 468 (Timothy McCarthy & John McMillan 
eds. 2003). Friedan discusses the importance of femininity, and 
points out the oppressive mores in American society. 
132 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see 
also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; see also 
112                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017) 
 
Political changes sculpted a new social landscape across 
America, including no-fault divorce. More recently, millennials 
have signaled conservative values that rose to prominence over 
the past few decades are held in low regard now.133 
Lawmakers should heed this current evolution, and 
reflect modern societal realities in divorce laws. As was the case 
in the 1960s, younger generations come of age with different 
values than their predecessors. Laws written generations ago 
are ill-fitted to serve the population now living under them.134 
States could avoid this unnecessary friction by reevaluating 
laws that no longer represent the governed, and that do not 
address some societal ill. Declining religious affiliation, 
particularly among millennials, tasks lawmakers with taking a 
second look at restrictive divorce laws that have roots in 
religious beliefs. Liberal movements of the 1960s and 70s 
spurred no-fault statutes around the country, and the time is 
ripe for conservative states to discard the leftovers of 
yesteryear. Lawmakers should reevaluate divorce laws to 
determine the necessity of complete agreement requirements 
and extended waiting periods. In the spirit of providing access 
to the courts to amicably resolve disputes, states should just 




                                                          
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Both legislative enactments and the 
Roe opinion provide prominent examples of society departing from 
what were once thought unshakeable traditional values. 
133 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, The GOP’s Millennial Problem Runs Deep 
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/25/the-gops-millennial-
problem-runs-deep/. This study shows just how socially liberal 
millennials are, while baby boomers are progressively more 
conservative as age increases. 
134 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015). The 
legalization of gay marriage represents one example of societal 
values changing the law. See also Colo. Const. art. 18, § 16. 
Coloradans amended their state constitution in 2012 to allow the 
legal possession and marketing of marijuana, joining Washington in 
decriminalizing and regulating a substance society, especially the 
younger demographic, saw as an acceptable personal choice. 
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VI. TENNESSEE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD PURE NO-FAULT 
DIVORCE 
 
Henry Drummond, depicting the part of attorney 
Clarence Darrow in Inherit the Wind, a movie based on Dayton, 
Tennessee’s Scopes Monkey Trial, declared to the court that “a 
wicked law, like cholera, destroys everyone it touches. Its 
upholders as well as its defiers.”135 Granted, Tennessee’s 
restrictive no-fault statute does not qualify as a wicked law. But 
even laws noble at inception can produce perverse 
consequences. The adverse effect of this law harms the very 
people whom proponents of religious-based restrictions sought 
to protect. 
 
A. TENNESSEE KEEPS COSTS UP AND ACCESS DOWN 
 
Lessening the no-fault burden would improve access to 
Tennessee courts. The Volunteer State can ill-afford to force its 
citizens to waste economic resources. Tennessee ranks in the 
bottom quintile of states with the most people living in 
poverty.136 With contested divorce costs running in the 
thousands of dollars,137 those below the poverty line, along with 
most middle class families, can easily be financially wiped out 
after a contentious divorce proceeding. Tennessee already 
holds the distinction for the highest bankruptcy rate.138 Like any 
                                                          
135 INHERIT THE WIND (United Artists 1960). 
136 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, PERCENT OF TOTAL 
POPULATION IN POVERTY, 2014 (2016), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/county-level-data-
sets/poverty.aspx#P345c97c54e8c48339ab8327ebfca5161_2_233iT3. 
This government survey found over 18% of Tennessee’s population 
live below the poverty line and over 25% of Tennessee children ages 
0-17 live below the poverty line. 
137 This estimate was based on a $250.00 hourly rate, which is 
considered the national average for a divorce attorney. See Kathleen 
Michon, How Much Will My Divorce Cost and How Long Will it Take?, 
NOLO (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/ctp/cost-of-divorce.html. 
138 Dave Flessner, Tennessee Still Leads Nation in Bankruptcies, 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Jan. 10, 2016), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/sto
ry/2016/jan/10/tennesssee-still-leads-nation-
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state, Tennessee’s poor have fewer property assets. But the poor 
typically have more of one common point of emphasis in 
divorce proceedings—children.139 Tennessee’s family law 
should focus on providing for these children or, at least, avoid 
harming them by squandering precious economic resources on 
fault-based divorce. Onerous agreement requirements may 
force lower income litigants into inequitable agreements that 
fail to address the best interest of affected parties, namely 
children.140 Equity and best interest aside, directing more 
people toward fault-based divorce via agreement requirements 
may cause other poor results. 
Moving toward pure no-fault divorce would shift some 
undesirable behavioral issues into criminal and tort forums 
better suited to provide sufficient outcomes. Tennesseans 
injured by conduct actionable in tort who are forced to litigate 
under a fault-based family law proceeding may preclude future 
litigation of the same conduct in a forum better situated to 
provide a remedy.141 Facts used in divorce proceedings to show 
fault may not address all the damage that occurred due to the 
equitable nature of divorce. With particularly egregious 
behavior, criminal or not, res judicata may prevent an injured 
plaintiff from seeking compensation for non-pecuniary harms 
or forgo a punitive damages award.142 
These regrettable outcomes may arise more often in 
communities with stronger ties to religious ideologies that are 
resistant to no-fault divorce. Ironically, a recent study in the 
                                                          
bankruptcies/343890/. In 2015, Tennessee ranked number one in 
bankruptcy filings for the 6th consecutive year. 
139 Yang Jiang, ET AL., Basic Facts About Low Income Children, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, (Feb. 2016) 
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_1145.pdf. Children 
comprise twenty-three percent of the total population but thirty-two 
percent of all people in poverty, signaling a higher ratio of children 
among those in poverty. 
140 Cf. Parkman, supra note 43, at 42. This author discusses the 
changing landscape of divorce negotiation after no-fault divorce. 
141 See Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). In Kemp, 
the court held that the doctrine of res judicata prevented her suit 
against her husband for assault and battery because her divorce 
award was based on the same facts. 
142 See id.; see also Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-
Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 305 (1997).  
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American Journal of Sociology found the best indicator for 
increased divorce by county was the concentration of 
evangelicals or conservatives in that county.143 To wit, 
restrictions based on conservative religious beliefs 
disproportionately affect the people who support no-fault 
divorce opponents. This same study identified that low income 
and lower educational attainment were directly related to 
higher incidences of divorce—both were common 
characteristics found in southern, conservative communities.144 
Moreover, communities that increasingly encouraged 
abstinence until marriage sustained higher incidences of 
divorce.145 Rural communities – typically poorer and steadfast 
in their faith – deserve better. 
 
B. TENNESSEE COURTS CONFUSE THE ISSUE 
 
The complete agreement requirement has such little 
relevance to actually dissolving the marriage that Tennessee 
courts have confused the issue.146 In 1995, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court reversed a decision that held that a wife had 
substantially contributed to property owned by her husband 
before the marriage.147 The Harrison court held that the real 
property in dispute was not marital property and that the wife 
was not entitled to share in the value.148 The majority opinion 
glossed over the ground for this divorce—irreconcilable 
differences.149 Tennessee’s complete agreement requirements 
predates the decision in Harrison,150 and shows just how much 
sense this requirement actually makes. Appellate court 
                                                          
143 Press Release, Jennifer Glass, Red States, Blue states, and Divorce: 
Understanding the Impact of Conservative Protestantism on 
Regional Variation in Divorce Rates, Counsel on Contemporary 




146 See Harrison v. Harrison, 912 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. 1995). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 124. 
150 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (West, WestlawNext current 
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary 
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly). 
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decisions after Harrison have amended or remanded trial court 
judgments that granted divorce based on irreconcilable 
differences for failing to comply with the statute.151 
A simplification of the divorce statute would make the 
judicial task easier and more efficient. If parties could petition 
for divorce on only one ground, confusion would be unlikely. 
Discarding the agreement requirement would limit the cases 
where a divorce is bounced back-and-forth between appellate 
and trial courts to comply with a misunderstood statutory 
requirement. These cases show the room for improvement. 
Tennessee lawmakers have made clear the conservative 
agenda that takes priority in the Tennessee legislature.152 
Traditional conservatives should operate with an eye toward a 
restrained form of government that believes less is more, rather 
than moral populism operating under the guise of 
conservatism. Conservatives love to quote Ronald Reagan who 
said, “[g]overnment is not the solution to the problem; 
government is the problem.”153 The underpinnings of fault-
based divorce fit well under President Reagan’s statement. 
Tennessee’s no-fault statute burdens domestic relations law 
with enforcing archaic values on a generation that increasingly 
does not share those same values. Continuing to restrict no-
fault divorce ignores current economic and cultural realties. In 
short, the situation has changed and so should the law. 
Conservative states like Tennessee should recalibrate divorce 




Tennessee domestic relations law should follow the 
current societal trends and loosen the restrictions on no-fault 
divorce. Keeping with traditional mores, the legislature persists 
                                                          
151 See Cook v. Cook, No. E2016–00042–COA–R3–CV, 2016 WL 
3679415 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2016); Norris v. Norris, No. E2014–
02353–COA–R3–CV, 2015 WL 9946262 (Aug. 24, 2015). 
152 See Joel Ebert, Tennessee’s 2016 Legislative Session: Key Moments, Key 




153 Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Inaugural Address 
(Jan. 20, 1981). 
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in requiring a complete agreement to avoid the expense and 
contentiousness of fault. To what end? Forcing parties to prove 
fault increases costs, decreases access and complicates matters 
even further. 
Tennessee’s statute runs the risk of unnecessarily 
compromising desirable outcomes that could preclude further 
litigation needed to address more severe misconduct. Pure no-
fault has not allowed people to avoid responsibility, 
significantly increased divorce rates, or adversely affected 
aggrieved parties. Besides the societal ills of fault-based 
divorce, the current statute has confused parties, attorneys, and 
courts. This increases costs and burdens the court system. Other 
remedies, when combined with pure no-fault divorce, more 
effectively address Tennessee’s domestic issues. 
Declining religious affiliation in younger generations 
and the undesirable consequences of fault-based divorce 
should compel Tennessee lawmakers to take a second look at 
the state’s current no-fault statute. Even if a pure no-fault model 
remains infeasible, Tennessee should remove the complete 
agreement requirement to plead irreconcilable differences, 
allowing litigants to access the court system without proof of 
fault. In other words, Tennessee should allow divorcing 
couples to just agree to disagree. 
